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May 26, 2006
Lisa Collins
Clerk of the Court
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
450 South State Street
Post Office Box 140210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0210
Re:

State v. Mark and Christina Gray, Case No. 20050136-CA

Dear Ms. Collins:
I am writing pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
to advise the Court of authority relevant to the above-referenced case that
recently came to my attention. Two cases—State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142,
~p.3d— and State v. Austin, 2006 UT App 184 (Memorandum Decision
concern the defendants' claim that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was
improper. A third case, State v. Terry, 2006 UT App 217 (Memorandum
Decision), pertains to defendants' claim that their attorneys were ineffective
for not requesting a lesser-included offense jury instruction.
State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, —P.3d— (jury instruction that
instructed the jury State must "eliminate all reasonable doubt" is proper
because it "did not convey the message that the State must only eliminate those
doubts that are sufficiently defined; neither did the State argue that the juror
need articulate and eliminate specific doubts").
State v. Austin, 2006 UT App 184 (Memorandum Decision) (same).
State v. Terry, 2006 UT App 217 (Memorandum Decision) (under
"highly deferential standard of review" applicable to claims of ineffective
assistance, defense counsel was not deficient in not requesting a lesserincluded offense instruction because "defense counsel's strategy was to
demonstrate that the State had failed to prove that Defendant was involved in
any crime, not that Defendant was guilty of the lesser-included charge . . . " ) .

160 EAST 300 SOUTH, SIXTH FLOOR • P.O. 140854 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

84114-0854 • TEL: (801) 366-0180 • FAX: (801) 366-0167

Copies of these opinions are attached for the convenience of the Court. Thank
you for your attention to this matter.
Very truly yours,

BRETT J. DELPORTO
Assistant Attorney General

cc: Barton J. Warren, Esq.
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT
BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS.
UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO
REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.

correctness, reasonable doubt instruction,
which instruction defendant
claimed
violated his due process rights, in
prosecution for drug offenses, where
defendant did not object to instruction at
trial. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14; Rules
Crim.Proc, Rule 19(e).

Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Franklin Eric HALLS, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20040939-CA.

121 Criminal Law €=^1134(3)
110k! 134(3) Most Cited Cases
Whether a jury instruction correctly states
the law is reviewable under a correction of
error standard, with no particular deference
given to the trial court's ruling.

April 13, 2006.

131 Criminal Law €=>l 137(2)
110k! 137(2) Most Cited Cases
Appellate court will not review an error
committed at trial when defendant led the
trial court into committing the error.

Background: Defendant was convicted in
the District Court, Monticello Department,
Lyle R. Anderson, J., of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, unlawful
possession of an imitation controlled
substance, and possession of paraphernalia.
Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Judith M.
Billings, J., held that:
(1) reasonable doubt instruction correctly
communicated to jury the principle of
reasonable doubt, and
(2) Court of Appeals would not review
issue of whether trial court erred in
enhancing defendant's sentence based on a
prior conviction of possession of a
controlled substance, as defendant invited
the error.
Affirmed.
HI Criminal Law €^>1038.1(5)
110kl038.1(5) Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals would review for plain
error or manifest injustice, rather than for

HI Criminal Law ©=*l 137(3)
110k! 137(3) Most Cited Cases
Court of Appeals would not apply invited
error doctrine to preclude appellate review
of defendant's challenge to reasonable doubt
instruction,
though
defense
counsel
expressly agreed to instruction at trial, in
drug prosecution, as instruction given
complied with then-current law, but that law
changed, which colored defense counsel's
failure to have raised an issue about
instruction at trial.
151 Criminal Law €^1030(1)
110kl030(l) Most Cited Cases
Manifest injustice or the plain error standard
of review requires appellant to show that an
error exists, the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant, or phrased
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differently, the appellate court's confidence
in the verdict is undermined.

an error committed at trial when that party
led the trial court into committing the error.

161 Criminal Law € ^ 7 8 9 ( 4 )
110k789(4) Most Cited Cases
So long as the court instructs the jury on the
necessity that defendant's guilt be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution
does not require that any particular form of
words be used in advising the jury of the
government's burden of proof; rather, taken
as a whole, the instructions must correctly
convey the concept of reasonable doubt to
the jury.

[101 Criminal Law €=>641.13(7)
110k641.13(7) Most Cited Cases
Even if defense counsel was deficient in
counseling defendant to stipulate to his prior
conviction for drug possession, defendant
was not prejudiced thereby, as parties agreed
that error in prior conviction judgment was
simply clerical, and, thus, prior judgment
was still final and effective for purposes of
enhancing defendant's sentence on his drug
convictions. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

121 Criminal Law €^>822(16)
110k822(16) Most Cited Cases
Reasonable doubt instruction, which
included phrase that state had to "eliminate
all reasonable doubt," taken as a whole,
correctly communicated to jury the principle
of reasonable doubt, in drug prosecution;
instruction did not convey message that state
only had to eliminate those doubts that were
sufficiently defined, and neither did state
argue that juror needed to articulate and
eliminate specific doubts.

Fill Criminal Law €==>996(1)
110k996(l) Most Cited Cases
A clerical error, once determined, can be
amended and made effective as of a prior
date so that the record accurately reflects
that which took place.
K. Andrew Fitzgerald, Moab, for Appellant.

181 Criminal Law €=^1137(2)
110k! 137(2) Most Cited Cases
Appellate court would not review on appeal
issue of whether trial court erred in
enhancing defendant's sentence based on a
prior conviction of possession of a
controlled substance, on basis that judgment
from prior conviction incorrectly stated that
he pled guilty to possession with intent to
distribute, when he had actually pled guilty
to simple possession, as defendant invited
the error by repeatedly stipulating to fact
that he had a prior conviction for possession.
121 Criminal Law €^>l 137(2)
110k! 137(2) Most Cited Cases
On appeal, a party cannot take advantage of

Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General and J.
Frederic Voros Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD,
and BILLINGS.
OPINION
BILLINGS, Judge:
*1 **1 Defendant Franklin Eric Halls
appeals from his convictions of one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, see Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (Supp.2005): one count of
unlawful possession of an imitation
controlled substance, see Utah Code Ann. §
58-37b-4 (2002); and one count of
possession of paraphernalia, see Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (2002). We affirm.
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BACKGROUND
**2 On March 1, 2004, Officer Jim
Eberling of the Monticello Police
Department and Agent Travis Clark, a
parole officer from the Department of
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole,
went to Defendant's parents' house to speak
to Defendant about a possible hit-and-run
accident. Upon arriving, they discovered
that Defendant was not home and decided to
wait for him to return from work. Shortly
thereafter, Defendant arrived at his parents'
home in a pickup truck driven by Jim
Abrams.
**3
Approaching Defendant's parents'
home, Abrams glanced over at Defendant
and noticed him bending over. He testified
that it looked as if Defendant was shoving
something under the seat. Abrams dropped
off Defendant and left.
**4 When Abrams arrived at his own
home, he checked under the seat and found a
black box containing some bags and scales.
Upset that Defendant
would
hide
paraphernalia in his truck, Abrams took the
items he found to the police station and gave
them to Police Chief Adair.
**5 Meanwhile, Officer Eberling and
Agent Clark conducted a search of
Defendant, his bedroom, and his vehicle.
Agent Clark accompanied Officer Eberling
to Defendant's residence because Agent
Clark had been having some problems with
Defendant and because Defendant had
recently
tested
positive
for
methamphetamine.
After
searching
Defendant's bedroom and truck, Officer
Eberling and Agent Clark took Defendant to
the police station to question him regarding
the hit-and-run accident and to possibly
administer a urinalysis drug test.

**6 As they arrived at the police station,
Chief Adair was across the street searching
Abrams's truck. Officer Eberling and Agent
Clark took Defendant into the station for
questioning. During questioning, Chief
Adair knocked on the door and handed
Officer Eberling the items found under the
seat in Abrams's truck. Those items included
a bag containing a white crystal substance, a
black box containing a set of scales and a
couple of small plastic bags, and a larger
empty bag. Chief Adair explained to Officer
Eberling how Abrams found these items.
**7 Officer Eberling and Agent Clark then
began to question Defendant regarding the
items. Defendant first denied that the items
belonged to him, but he eventually admitted
that the items were his. Defendant told
Officer Eberling and Agent Clark that the
white crystal substance was his and that it
was not methamphetamine, but a cutting
agent called "MSM." Defendant stated that
he was planning to mix the cutting agent
into an ounce of methamphetamine so that
he could use one ounce for free and sell the
other. Defendant also stated that the scales
were used to weigh the methamphetamine
he sold and admitted that two of the small
plastic
bags
had
contained
methamphetamine.
Subsequent
testing
confirmed that the white crystal substance
was not methamphetamine; the small plastic
bags and scales tested positive for
methamphetamine.
*2 **8 At trial, Defendant testified that he
did not know anything about the items found
in Abrams's truck and denied owning them.
Defendant stated that on the day he was
questioned about the items found in
Abrams's truck, he believed the police had
pulled Abrams over, searched his truck, and
found the contraband. Because Officer
Eberling and Agent Clark told Defendant
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that he was already in trouble for violating
his parole, he decided to admit ownership of
the contraband to protect Abrams from any
potential punishment.
**9 The jury found Defendant guilty of
possession of a controlled substance,
possession of an imitation controlled
substance, and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
After
his
conviction,
Defendant stipulated to a prior conviction of
possession of a controlled substance for
purposes of enhancement, even though
Defendant's prior judgment read that he was
convicted of possession with intent to
distribute. The trial court indicated that there
was a clerical error in the prior judgment,
but that Defendant clearly had the prior
conviction to enhance Defendant's current
conviction to a second degree felony,
resulting in a one- to fifteen-year sentence.
Defendant appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[11T21 **10 On appeal, Defendant asserts
that the reasonable doubt jury instruction
given at trial incorrectly stated the law and
violated his due process rights. "Whether [a
jury] instruction correctly states the law is
reviewable under a correction of error
standard, with no particular deference given
to the trial court's ruling." State v. Archuleta,
850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (Utah 1993). However,
rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
"Unless a party objects to an instruction or
the failure to give an instruction, the
instruction may not be assigned as error
except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah
R.Crim. P. 19(e). Defendant admits that he
never objected to the reasonable doubt jury
instruction at trial. Therefore, pursuant to
rule 19(e), Defendant's failure to object to
the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial
renders the instruction "reviewable for plain
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error, or manifest injustice, rather than for
correctness." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 4 5 ^
16, 122 P.3d 543; see also State v. Casey,
2003 UT 55,11 40, 82P.3dll06 ("[I]n most
circumstances [,] the term manifest injustice
is synonymous with the plain error standard
...." (quotations and citation omitted)).
£3J. **11 Defendant also asserts that the
trial court erred when it enhanced
Defendant's sentence based on the parties'
stipulation that Defendant had a prior
conviction
for
possession,
because
Defendant's prior judgment incorrectly
stated that the prior conviction was for
possession with the intent to distribute.
According to Defendant, since the prior
judgment is not correct, it cannot be a final
judgment for the purposes of enhancement.
However, because Defendant invited the
error, which he now appeals, we will not
review it. We will not review "an error
committed at trial when [Defendant] led the
trial court into committing the error." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
ANALYSIS
I. Defendant's Reasonable Doubt Jury
Instruction
*3 **12
Defendant asserts that the
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at
his trial incorrectly stated the law and
violated the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. At Defendant's
trial, the reasonable doubt instruction was in
compliance with State v. Robertson, 932
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), overruled in
relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,
116 P.3d 305. It instructed the jury that
"[t]he State must eliminate all reasonable
doubt." However, after Defendant's trial, the
Utah Supreme Court expressly abandoned
the "obviate all reasonable doubt"
requirement of the Robertson test. State v.
Reyes, 2005 UT 33,11 30, 116 P.3d 305.

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Relying on Reyes, see id^ Defendant now
asserts that under the new standard, the
reasonable doubt jury instruction given at
trial violated his due process rights.
HI **13 Rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent
part: "Unless a party objects to an
instruction or the failure to give an
instruction, the instruction may not be
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest
injustice." Utah R.Crim. P. 19(e). Because
Defendant admits that he did not object to
the reasonable doubt jury instruction at trial,
"we will only remand for a new trial if the
error ... constitutes a 'manifest injustice.' "
TFN11 Casey, 2003 UT 55 at | 39. 82 P.3d
1106.
[5] **14 "[M]anifest injustice" has been
defined as being "synonymous with the
'plain error' standard." Id. at f 40. The
manifest injustice or the plain error standard
requires the appellant to show that" '(i) [a]n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error
is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant, or phrased
differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined.' " Id at ^ 41 (quoting State y.
Powell 872 P.2d 1027, 1031 (Utah 1994)).
It is under this plain error standard that we
review Defendant's appeal of the reasonable
doubt jury instruction given at his trial.
**15 Under the first prong of the plain
error standard, Defendant must show that
"[a]n error exists." Id_ Defendant asserts that
the error in the reasonable doubt jury
instruction given at trial is the use of the
phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt." In
Reyes, the Utah Supreme Court expressly
abandoned the phrase "obviate all
reasonable doubt" as a requirement for a
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reasonable doubt jury instruction. 2005 UT
33 a t f 30, 116P.3d305. For the purposes
of this appeal, the parties do not dispute that
"obviate all reasonable doubt" and
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" are similar.
However, we consider the "eliminate all
reasonable doubt" jury instruction to be less
troublesome than the Reyes "obviate all
reasonable doubt" instruction.
{61**16 In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, 122
P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme Court
determined that Reyes effectively overruled
the Robertson test for reasonable doubt jury
instructions and adopted the test enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court in
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 22, 114
S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). See
Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at f 21, 122 P.3d 543.
The Victor test provides:
*4 [S]o long as the court instructs the jury
on the necessity that the defendant's guilt
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Constitution does not require that any
particular form of words be used in
advising the jury of the government's
burden of proof. Rather, "taken as a whole,
the instructions [must] correctly convey
the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury."
Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239
(second alteration in original) (citations
omitted). This overarching principle, that
"taken as a whole, [the reasonable doubt
jury
instruction
must]
correctly
communicate the principle of reasonable
doubt" to the jury, is now the standard for
"assessing the validity of reasonable doubt
instructions." Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at ^T 21,
122 P.3d 543. Therefore, if Defendant's
reasonable doubt jury instruction, " 'taken as
a whole, ... correctly convey[ed] the concept
of reasonable doubt to the jury,'" id. at | 20
(quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22, 114 S.Ct.
1239), then it was not erroneous. We

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

2006 WL 947754
. „ P.3d —, 2006 WL 947754 (Utah App.), 549 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2006 UT App 142
(Cite as: 2006 WL 947754 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 142)
conclude that Defendant's jury instruction
was not in error.
**17 The Reyes court found the "obviate
all reasonable doubt" concept "linguistically
opaque and conceptually suspect." 2005 UT
33.1 26, 116 P.3d 305. The potential
problem with the "obviate all reasonable
doubt" requirement is that it
contemplates a two-step undertaking: the
identification of the doubt and a testing of
the validity of the doubt against the
evidence.... The "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard does not, however,
condition a conclusion that a doubt is
reasonable on an ability either to articulate
the doubt or to state a reason for it.
Id at 1 27. Therefore, "ft]o the extent that
the Robertson 'obviate' test would permit the
State to argue that it need only obviate
doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test
works to improperly diminish the State's
burden." Id. at 1f 28 (emphasis added).
Essentially, the obviate test's "substantial
risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on
a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable
doubt," id. at 1 30, comes from its potential
to allow the State to argue that a juror must
articulate and obviate specific doubts.
**18 This is not the situation here. The
trial court's jury instruction stated:
A defendant is presumed innocent until
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
This presumption follows the defendant
throughout the trial. If a defendant's guilt
is not shown beyond a reasonable doubt,
the defendant should be acquitted.
The [S]tate must eliminate all reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
not proof to an absolute certainty.
Reasonable doubt is a doubt based on
reason, which is reasonable in view of all
the evidence. Reasonable doubt is not a
doubt based on fancy, imagination, or
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wholly speculative possibility. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is enough proof
to satisfy the mind, or convince the
understanding of those bound to act
conscientiously, and enough to eliminate
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt that reasonable people would
entertain based upon the evidence in the
case.
*5 [7] **19 This reasonable doubt jury
instruction given at Defendant's trial did not
convey the message that the State must only
eliminate those doubts that are sufficiently
defined; neither did the State argue that the
juror need articulate and eliminate specific
doubts. Instead, the jury instruction, "taken
as a whole, correctly communicate[d] the
principle of reasonable doubt" to the jury.
Cruz, 2005 UT 45 at 1 21, 122 P.3d 543,
**20 Although the language "obviate all
reasonable doubt" has been abandoned by
Reyes, see 2005 UT 33 at f 34, 116 P.3d
305, we are not persuaded that the use of
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" in
Defendant's jury instruction constitutes
manifest injustice because the reasonable
doubt
jury
instruction
"correctly
communicate [d] the principle of reasonable
doubt" to the jury. Stale v. Cruz, 2005 UT
45,1 21, 122P.3d543. [FN21 Therefore, we
do not remand for a new trial.
II. Defendant's Sentence Enhancement
**21 Defendant also claims that the trial
court erred when it enhanced his sentence
based on a prior conviction of possession of
a controlled substance, even though
Defendant stipulated to the prior conviction.
Essentially, Defendant argues that because
the judgment from his first conviction for
possession incorrectly stated that he pleaded
guilty to possession with intent to distribute,
when he actually only pleaded to simple
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possession, the judgment is ineffectual.
[81T91 **22
Defendant repeatedly
stipulated to the fact that he had a prior
conviction for possession, thereby inviting
the error he now appeals. M[0]n appeal, a
party cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the
trial court into committing the error." State
v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993).
After jury selection, counsel for Defendant
told the trial court that if the jury found
Defendant guilty, Defendant would stipulate
to a prior conviction for possession. Defense
counsel also explained that the prior
judgment contained a clerical error, but that
Defendant was still willing to stipulate to the
prior conviction. Moreover, after Defendant
was found guilty, Defendant again stipulated
to the prior conviction for possession. When
the trial court asked if there was "[a]ny legal
reason why sentence should not be
pronounced," counsel for Defendant replied,
"None, your honor."
riOirill **23 Clearly, Defendant invited
the alleged error he now appeals by
repeatedly stipulating to the fact that he had
a prior conviction for possession. The
rationale behind this stipulation is clear:
regardless of whether the prior conviction
was for simple possession or possession
with intent to distribute, the prior conviction
enhanced
the
Defendant's
sentence.
Therefore, because Defendant invited the
error he now appeals, we will not review it.
{FN31
CONCLUSION
**24 The reasonable doubt jury instruction
given at Defendant's trial is not manifestly
unjust because it correctly conveyed the
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.
Further, because Defendant invited the error,
we decline to address Defendant's claim that
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his sentence enhancement is somehow
erroneous because of a clerical error in
Defendant's prior judgment.
**25
WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W.
BENCH, Presiding Judge PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge.
FN1. Based on the invited error
doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court
has stated that "if counsel, either by
statement or act, affirmatively
represented to the court that he or
she had no objection to the jury
instruction, we will not review the
instruction under the manifest
injustice
exception."
State v.
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,f 54, 70 P.3d
111. In this case, defense counsel not
only failed to object to the
reasonable doubt jury instruction, but
also expressly agreed to the
reasonable doubt jury instruction.
Utah law has not addressed whether
the invited error doctrine applies
when there has been a change of
settled law. However, federal law
states that "[w]here a defendant
submits proposed jury instructions in
reliance on current law, and on direct
appeal that law is declared
constitutionally infirm, we will not
apply the invited error doctrine.
Instead, we will review for plain
error." United States v. West Indies
Transv., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 305 (3d
Cir.1997). Because we similarly
acknowledge an exception to the
preservation rule for exceptional
circumstances "where a change in
law or the settled interpretation of
law colored the failure to have raised
an issue at trial," State v. Irwin, 924
P.2d 5, 10 (Utah Ct.App.1996), we
do not apply the invited error
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doctrine here.
FN2. In State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,
122 P.3d 543, the Utah Supreme
Court reviewed reasonable doubt
jury instructions that included the
phrase "dispel all reasonable doubt"
and found that those instructions
were not erroneous. Id. atf | IK 18.
Because "dispel all reasonable
doubt" and "eliminate all reasonable
doubt" are functionally equivalent,
Defendant's reasonable doubt jury
instruction is not erroneous.

judgment would still be final and
effective for the purposes of
enhancing Defendant's sentence.
... P.3d — , 2006 WL 947754 (Utah App.),
549 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 2006 UT App 142
END OF DOCUMENT

FN3. In the alternative, Defendant
argues that his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance because he
counseled Defendant to stipulate to
the prior conviction. However, even
if we were to find defense counsel's
assistance defective for this reason,
Defendant cannot prove that "but for
counsel's deficient performance [,]
there is a reasonable probability that
the outcome ... would have been
different." Wickham v. Galetka, 2002
UT72,f 19, 61P.3d978 (quotations
and citation omitted). Rule 30(b) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure states that "[clerical
mistakes in judgments ... may be
corrected by the court at any time
and after such notice, if any, as the
court may order." Utah R.Crim. P.
30(b) (emphasis added). Moreover, a
clerical error, once determined, can
be amended and made "effective as
of a prior date so that the record
accurately reflects that which took
place." Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d
298, 299 (Utah 1984). Because both
the trial court and the parties agreed
that the error in the prior judgment
was simply clerical, the prior
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1174241 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 184
(Cite as: 2006 WL 1174241 (Utah App.))
UNPUBLISHED
OPINION.
CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Graham Woodruff AUSTIN, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20050134-CA.
May 43 2006.
Seventh District, Moab Department,
041700101; The Honorable Lvle R.
Anderson.
William L. Schultz, Moab, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Erin Riley, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee.
Before Judges BENCH, GREENWOOD,
and DAVIS.
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For
Official Publication)
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
*1 Defendant Graham Woodruff Austin
argues, under the standard set forth in State
v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, \ 30, 116 P.3d 305,
that part of the reasonable doubt jury
instruction--" [i]t is the burden of the State to
eliminate all reasonable doubt"--violated his
due process rights. Because Defendant did
not object to the reasonable doubt jury
instruction at trial, he asserts plain error on
appeal. See State v. Halls, 2006 UT App
142, 1 1 13- 14. "Under the first prong of
the plain error standard, Defendant must
show that '[a]n error exists." ' Id. at f 15
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(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
"[I]f Defendant's reasonable doubt jury
instruction, taken as a whole, ... correctly
convey[ed] the concept of reasonable doubt
to the jury, then it was not erroneous." Id. at
f 16 (omission and second alteration in
original) (quotations and citations omitted).
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt
jury instruction given at Defendant's trial did
not convey the message that the State must
only eliminate those doubts that are
sufficiently defined; neither did the State
argue that the juror need articulate and
eliminate specific doubts." Id. at Tf 19. As
we held in Halls, "we are not persuaded that
the use of 'eliminate all reasonable doubt" '
constitutes plain error. Id. at ^J 20. We
conclude that the jury instruction, "taken as
a whole, correctly communicate[d] the
principle of reasonable doubt." State v. Cruz,
2005UT45,f 21,122P.3d543.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court
erred by (1) imposing consecutive sentences
without the benefit of a presentence
investigation report (PSI) and (2) failing to
adequately consider Defendant's history,
remorse, and rehabilitative needs in
violation of Utah Code section 76-3-401(2),
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003).
"Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the
court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the
imposition of sentence ... for the purpose of
obtaining a[PSI] ... or information from
other sources about the defendant." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a) (Supp.2005)
(emphasis added). [FN1] This statute gives
the trial court discretion to impose a
sentence without ordering a PSI. See State v.

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in P.3d
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1174241 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 184
(Cite as: 2006 WL 1174241 (Utah App.))
Madsen. 2002 UT App 345, If f 13-15, 57
P.3d
1134. Additionally,
Defendant
specifically requested that the trial court
"waive his time for sentencing and be
sentenced today/' knowing that no PSI
would be completed. The trial court granted
Defendant's request and sentenced him
immediately after the trial concluded.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in
sentencing Defendant without the benefit of
a PSI.
FN1. There have been no relevant
amendments to the applicable
statutes
since
Defendant's
commission of the crimes in this
matter.
For convenience,
we
therefore cite to the most recent
version of the statutes.
Further, in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences, the trial court is
required to "consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses, the number of
victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-40\(2). Defendant asserts
that the trial court was unable to sufficiently
consider "his history, his remorse, and his
rehabilitative needs," in large part because a
PSI had not been completed.
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concerning Defendant's immediate remorse,
his apology to the victim's family at trial,
and the victim impact statements. As a
result, we hold that the trial court
sufficiently considered all of the sentencing
factors and did not abuse its discretion by
imposing
consecutive
sentences.
Furthermore,
Defendant's
claim
of
ineffective assistance of counsel is without
merit because counsel was not "objectively
deficient" in not objecting to the lack of a
PSI and to the imposition of consecutive
sentences. State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App
247, f 21,9P.3d777.
Accordingly, we affirm.
WE
CONCUR:
PAMELA
T.
GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge
and JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1174241
(Utah App.), 2006 UT App 184
END OF DOCUMENT

*2 "Although the trial court did not
explicitly address the enumerated factors in
section ["76-3-40If2) ], there is ample
evidence in the record that the court
considered these factors at the time of
Defendant's
sentencing."
State
v.
Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, Tj 30, 82
P.3d 1167. The trial court here received
evidence concerning Defendant's drug
addiction, the recent hospitalization of his
mother, his failing marriage, his recent
unemployment, and his car braking down.
The trial court also received evidence
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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GREENWOOD, Associate Presiding Judge:
Defendant Robert Carl Terry appeals his conviction for two
counts of possession of clandestine laboratory precursors while
in possession of a firearm, a first degree felony. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 58-37d-4(l)(a), -5(1)(a) (2004). On appeal, Defendant
argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
Defendant also argues that the trial court's failure to
adequately instruct the jury concerning a lesser-included offense
was plain error. We affirm.
Defendant first asserts that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request
jury instructions on a lesser-included offense. Specifically,
Defendant contends that there was a rational basis for the jury
to acquit him of the enhanced charge of clandestine laboratory
precursors and instead convict him of the lesser-included offense
of possession of a controlled substance precursor. See id.
§§ 58-37c-3(12)(k), -19(2), -20(1) (2002). An ineffective
assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal
is reviewed as a question of law. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT
25,16, 89 P.3d 162.

To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy both prongs of a test established by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). To meet the first prong, a defendant must show that
counsel's performance was deficient and that specific acts or
omissions fell below an objective standard of reasonable
performance. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76,519, 12 P. 3d
92; Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57,121, 88 P.3d 353. To satisfy
the second prong, a defendant must show that he was prejudiced by
counsel's deficient performance. See id.
To bolster his argument that his counsel's performance was
deficient, Defendant cites State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah
1983), for the proposition that a defendant's request for lesserincluded offense instructions must be granted if (1) the offenses
are related because the statutory elements overlap and the
evidence at trial involves proof of some or all of those
overlapping elements; and (2) the evidence provides a "rational
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
charged and convicting him of the included offense." Id. at 159
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (2003)).
The propriety of a lesser-included offense instruction is
determined by the evidence presented at trial. See State v.
Kruger, 2000 UT 60,514, 6 P.3d 1116 (stating that the trial court
must decide whether there is a "sufficient quantum of evidence"
to ascertain whether a rational basis exists to "support both
acquittal of the greater and conviction of the lesser offense").
In the instant case, Defendant provides only cursory references
to the record and fails to cite relevant authority or caselaw to
support his claim that, if requested, a lesser-included offense
instruction would have been appropriate in this case.
Consequently, Defendant fails to show how the jury would have had
a "rational basis," Baker, 671 P.2d at 159, to acquit Defendant
of clandestine laboratory precursors and instead convict him of
the lesser-included charge of possession of a controlled
substance precursor. Therefore, Defendant's reliance on Baker is
unavailing.
Moreover, Defendant's failure to demonstrate that this case
was appropriate for a lesser-included offense instruction defeats
his argument that trial counsel's performance did not meet an
objective standard of reasonable performance. See Litherland,
2000 UT 76 at 519. At trial, defense counsel's strategy was to
demonstrate that the State had failed to prove that Defendant was
involved in any crime, not that Defendant was guilty of the
lesser-included charge of a controlled substance precursor. Such
a strategy does not constitute ineffective assistance. See State
v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where trial counsel could
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reasonably have chosen not to request lesser-included aggravated
assault instruction to avoid weakening kidnaping defense). We
necessarily apply a highly deferential standard of review to
trial counsel's performance. See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d
461, 466 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . Failure to do so "would produce
too great a temptation to second-guess trial counsel's
performance on the basis of an inanimate record." Id. Applying
a deferential standard to the facts at hand, we note that trial
counsel's strategy not to seek lesser-included instructions could
have been "sound trial strategy." Litherland, 2000 UT 76 at 119
(quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, we conclude that
trial counsel did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonable performance.1
Defendant additionally argues that the trial court's failure
to sua sponte instruct the jury about the lesser-included offense
of possession of a clandestine laboratory precursor was plain
error. To establish plain error, an appellant must show (1) the
existence of an error; (2) that the error should have been
obvious to the trial court; and (3) that the error harmed the
appellant and absent such error a more favorable outcome was
reasonably likely. See State v. Nelson-Wacrcroner, 2004 UT 29,116,
94 P.3d 186 (Utah 2004) . A plain error claim is a question of
law, which we review for correctness. See Krucrer, 2000 UT 60 at
Sill.
It is well settled that a court has no independent duty to
give a lesser-included instruction unless a defendant so
requests. See State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 94 (Utah 1982);
State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618, 621 (1955).
Hence, to the extent Defendant argues that the trial court's
failure to independently give such an instruction was error, his
argument fails.
Moreover, because Defendant cannot show that counsel's
failure to request lesser-included instructions was not the
result of a strategic decision to seek acquittal on all charges,
we need not further consider his plain-error argument. See State
because Defendant cannot meet the first prong of the test
enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984),
we need not consider the second prong. See State v. Diaz, 2 002
UT App 288,138, 55 P. 3d 1131. However, even if we were to
consider the second prong, Defendant would be unable to
demonstrate that counsel's alleged deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome of his case. Defendant fails to cite to
the record or proffer evidence to show he was prejudiced by trial
counsel's performance. As a result, Defendant does not meet the
second prong of the Strickland test.
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v. Winfield. 2006 UT 4,8114, 128 P.3d 1171 (explaining that "we
have declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel,
either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the
[proceedings].") (alterations in original) (quotations and
citation omitted); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah
1996) ("We have held repeatedly that on appeal, a party cannot
take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led
the trial court into committing the error." (quotations and
citation omitted)). In this instance, we reiterate that
counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions could have
been the product of a "conscious decision to refrain from
[seeking an instruction]." State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 716
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quotations and citation omitted). Hence,
Defendant's plain error argument also fails.
We affirm.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

WE CONCUR:

James Z. Davis, Judge

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge
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